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Abstract  
This research examines the progress achieved and the costs incurred as a result of 
the application of a developmental state model in Ethiopia. To this end, the 
researcher relied on secondary sources. Based on a thorough analysis of relevant 
sources, the following findings are obtained. Even though the developmental state 
has brought an observable level of economic growth, it has also caused several 
detrimental effects in other spheres: eroding the value of pluralism; endangering 
human rights; entrenching a single-party authoritarian rule; leading to rampant 
corruption; intensifying arbitrary intervention in the life of citizens. In 
implementing the model, the focus was on economic growth while the political 
aspect of it was sidelined. As a result, the researcher suggests that economic 
growth and political transformation (democratization) should be valued equally 
and pursued side-by-side, not in tandem. 
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The Notion of Developmental State 
The concept developmental state has no precise definition; it has been subject to an 
ongoing debate by authorities in the area. Notwithstanding this, the literature in the 
area has leaned more towards associating the term with the proactive role of a state 
in the economic development. It is conceived as a state which strives to achieve 
economic development by creating and regulating the economic and political 
relationships that can support a sustained industrialization (Chang, 2009). For 
Chalmers Johnson, developmental state is a state whose foremost and single-
minded priority is economic development, defined in terms of growth, 
productivity, and competitiveness (Onis, 1991). It is still described as ―a state that 
is and seeks to be a strong player in the economy of a nation with a view to 
enhancing economic development‖ (Sehen and Tsegaye, 2012, p. 7). Hence, the 
concept is closely associated with the rapid advancement of industrialization and 
socio-economic transformation through a strong government involvement in the 
economy. It is claimed that the developmental state has been initially practiced in 
the 19
th
 century, notably, Bismarck‘s Prussia and Meiji‘s Japan (Bolesta, 2007; 
Johnson, 1982; Chang, 2009). However, the most remarkable experience of it with 
a successful socioeconomic transformation was recorded in the East Asian states 
between the 1960s and 1980s (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). The application of such a 
model enabled them to miraculously advance their economy and escape from the 
perils of poverty (Kim, 2009; Boyd and Ngo, 2005). As a result of this fact, 
scholars on the subject use the developmental state theory mainly to explain such a 
rapid industrialization and economic growth in the East Asian states, which are 
also referred as the Asian Tigers (Bolesta, 2007; United Nations, 2007; Boyd and 
Ngo, 2005). 
Ideologically, the developmental state is neither a capitalist nor a socialist 
system. It, rather, lies in between a free market capitalist economic system and a 
centrally-planned command economic system (Bolesta, 2007; Boyd and Ngo, 
2005). It borrows certain features from these diametrically opposite politico-
economic perspectives. While retaining the capitalist economic environment, the 
developmental state ideology encourages state intervention in the economy. This is 
true because, as Johnson (1982) notes, a developmental state sets a substantive 
social and economic goals. It is even understood as ―an emphatic state, a hard 
state, relatively autonomous/independent, with a decidedly interventionist bent on 
seeking not only to regulate, guide, and shape, but also to monitor and control, the 
economy‖ (Sehen and Tsegaye, 2012, p. 19). However, this does not mean the 
replacement of the market with a socialist system of planning and control 
(Heywood, 2013). Developmental state is not, again, identical with a social 
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democracy that is also a blend of capitalist and socialist systems. This is because in 
the developmental state intervention is required to bring economic progress while 
in the social democracy intervention is justified by ensuring fairness, equality, 
social justice, and support to the underdogs (Sehen and Tsegaye, 2012, p. 19). A 
developmental state is, thus, an interventionist state which is devoted to play a 
central role in bringing a fast economic development. 
 
Some Underlying Features of a Developmental State 
As can be deduced from the literature on the subject, a developmental state is 
characterized by, but not limited to, the following basic features. Firstly, the 
overriding objective of a developmental state is achieving a fast socioeconomic 
development via the process of industrialization (Bolesta, 2007). In so doing, a 
shift from import-substituting industrialization to export-oriented industrialization 
is necessary (Kim, 2009). East Asian states achieved a rapid economic 
development since technocratic bureaucrats have made economic development 
their top priority and long term goal (Boyd and Ngo, 2005). 
Secondly, developmental state needs a competent meritocratic autonomous 
bureaucracy. In a developmental state, bureaucrats are powerful professionals who 
are protected from the influence of elected politicians (Sehen and Tsegaye, 2012; 
Bolesta, 2007; Asayehgn, 2012). They facilitate the socioeconomic transformation 
of a state by enjoying a high degree of political autonomy (Haggard, 2018; 
Bolesta, 2007; Boyd and Ngo, 2005). Relating to this, it is stated that the 
politicians ―reign‖ while the bureaucrats ―rule‖ (Haggard, 2018; Onis, 1991). This 
indicates the real power of bureaucrats in the development endeavor of a state. 
This meritocratic recruitment of such autonomous, capable bureaucrats takes the 
center stage in the East Asian states‘ miraculous, skyrocketing economic 
performance (Edigheji, 2010).   
Thirdly, a developmental state is an interventionist state in nature. The 
state actively involves in the economy by regulating, guiding and controlling it. Its 
intervention is single-mindedly aimed at promoting industrial growth and 
economic development (Heywood, 2013). 
Fourthly, it has a capitalist economic environment, as private sectors are 
partners in the development of a state (Bolesta, 2007; Onis, 1991). In other words, 
there is a public-private partnership. However, the partnership is not open to all 
private sectors; rather, it is for selected strong enterprises that enjoy government 
subsidies. Besides, such a public-private cooperation/partnership doesn‘t result 
from voluntary compliance by the private business elites; rather, it is due to the 





This model is now spreading, beyond East Asia, across various countries 
of the world. Many countries are rushing to adopt the East Asian model of 
development, albeit in some countries with necessary alterations. Ethiopia, which 
is what this paper mainly grapples with, is no exception in this move. Concerns 
regarding whether a developmental state model is applicable in Ethiopia have 
taken center stage in the recent literature (i.e. Ayenachew, 2014; Sehen and 
Tsegaye, 2012; Mesgna, 2015).  
 
Methodological Consideration  
This article adds to the existing discourse on the subject by examining the actual 
and potential gains and costs (a relatively less discussed aspect) of the adoption of 
a developmental state model in Ethiopia. This motive has emanated from the 
writer‘s thesis that the Ethiopian government has taken economic growth as a 
metric of governance and hence applied (and potentially will continue to apply) the 
developmental state model at the costs of some basic democratic precepts to ensure 
its long-lasting survival in power. Accordingly, the researcher tries to achieve the 
following basic research objectives. 
 
 To shed light on the patterns of change in the ideological orientations of 
Ethiopia across the last successive three regimes 
 To reveal the actual and potential positive effects of a developmental state 
model in Ethiopia 
 To examine the actual and potential adverse effects of a developmental 
state model in Ethiopia 
 
This study employed a qualitative approach. Qualitative research attempts 
to interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people attach to them. In other 
words, qualitative research is, basically, interpretive in that it involves analyzing 
data and finally making interpretation or drawing conclusions about the data 
analyzed (Creswell, 2003). Accordingly, secondary data that were collected 
through a thorough reading of books, journal articles, reports, and credible internet 
sources are qualitatively interpreted and analyzed. 
Patterns of Change in the Ideological Orientations of Ethiopia  
Historically Ethiopia has experienced various forms of politico-economic 
orientations across different regimes. The country underwent an age-old ―feudal‖ 
system until the collapse of the imperial (Haile Sellasie) regime by popular 
upheaval in 1974. This long history of ―feudalism‖ was characterized by a 
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traditional social structure where the critical means of production was land; hence 
agriculture was the engine of development throughout the imperial period. This 
quasi-feudal system defined the social/production relations of the two fundamental 
social classes, namely the peasantry and the landlord (Addis Hiwet, 1975; 
Alemayehu, 2007). Accordingly, the social relation was exploitative in that 
peasants were reduced to tenants and subordinated to the landowners. This was 
very much apparent especially in the southern part of the country (Markakis and 
Nega, 1986). The political system during the Imperial period was also highly 
centralized under a despotic monarchy, which used to allocate land to those who 
kept their allegiance and support to the government. And, there was no room for 
alternative political forces to organize and make heard the voices of both rural and 
urban people. Eventually, the politico-economic suffering led to the above 
mentioned popular revolt (involving peasants, drivers, teachers, soldiers, students) 
in 1974 that ended up with toppling Emperor Haile Sellasie and terminating the 
age-old monarchical rule in Ethiopia once and for all.  
Following this historic event, the Military regime (Derg) acceded to the 
ruling power with a completely different ideology, socialism, or command 
economic system, as Ethiopia joined the Eastern bloc. This happened by 
eradicating the feudal system and making land a public property. However, the 
period of this militaristic rule has been blamed to be ―lost decades‖ because of 
economic stagnation (Arkebe, 2018). Between 1974/75 and 1989/90, the average 
GDP growth was decelerated to 2.3% from 4% between 1960 and 1974 
(Alemayehu, 2007). This was attributable to the economy‘s dependence on 
agriculture, which is vulnerable to the vagaries of nature. Also, the compulsion of 
farmers to provide military service coupled with the institution of centralized 
planning and the nationalization of land, among others, made agriculture stagnant 
and unable to support the industry. Moreover, given the militaristic nature of the 
rule and the prevailing recurrent political turmoil, the precedence was given to the 
defense industry and hence capital investment was geared towards defense needs, 
which were mostly met by the Soviet Union and its allies (Arkebe, 2018). 
Eventually, the regime was deposed mainly because of the political setbacks.  
After experiencing a centrally-planned command economic system until 
the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, the current government, again, came up with a 
western liberal ideology (Tsehai, 2009; Muller, 2015). At the time, it was not 
convenient to follow some other types of politico-economic model as the 
prevailing world-wide dominant ideology was liberal capitalism following the 
conclusion of the Cold-War with the triumphant success of the Western bloc led by 





mankind‘s ideological evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). Most importantly, it was the 
US that contributed a lot in bringing the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) into power. Thus, to show its allegiance and thereby 
enjoy US‘s and some other western states‘ blessings in the course of consolidating 
its power, jumping on the bandwagon and advocating the liberal ideology was the 
choice at hand. One can maintain the fact that the country subscribed to the 
western liberal ideology has helped the regime in consolidating its power. 
However, facts on the ground show that such an adherence to western ideology 
brought neither a real western type of liberal electoral democracy nor economic 
development. In fact, the regime was overlapping the model with another politico-
economic world view, i.e. revolutionary democracy, and its liberal democracy 
rhetoric was not consistent with the actual practices. Hence, the government‘s 
official adoption of the model was just a token move in response to external 
pressures. 
After advocating a free market economic system for about ten years, the 
government officially declared its shift to the developmental state model, without 
still a clear break from its revolutionary democracy adherence, believing that the 
free market economic system cannot function in Ethiopia‘s condition without a 
well thought out state intervention (Muller, 2015). The conviction came on account 
of the fact that the country‘s economy was very small and the factors of production 
were highly constrained and thus impossible to compete in the global market 
unless the state takes the guiding role on development (De Waal, 2018). 
Consequently, the state has been empowered to guide the country‘s entire 
economy, not to invest at micro-scale. This change came along with the rise of 
Asian countries with an alternative economic model, thereby diminishing the 
country‘s exclusive dependence on the West.  The formal introduction of the idea 
of developmental state in Ethiopia is, therefore, a recent phenomenon. Concerns 
regarding whether the developmental state model is applicable in Ethiopia have 
recent national discourses by researchers, politicians, and been the focus of the 
academia. The following sections discuss the progress witnessed and the 
detrimental effects encountered (and possibly will continue to encounter) because 
of the model adopted and the way it is implemented. 
 
Highlighting the Economic Progress 
It is imperative to acknowledge the progress witnessed in the country following the 
adoption of the developmental state model. This is true, especially, with regard to 
the country‘s economic performance. The adoption of this model almost coincided 
with the formal launch of Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
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Program (SDPRP) in 2003, focusing on agriculture, education, and infrastructure 
development (UNDP, 2017). The program elevated the GDP from 2.3% to 5.9%, 
though it could not take people out of a grinding poverty. Building on the positive 
achievements of the program in 2005, Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) was launched emphasizing on urban 
development, which was overlooked in the previous program (UNDP, 2017). With 
this initiative, the country managed to achieve a high economic growth (11%) and 
reduced the poverty level.  
Most importantly, the developmental state orientation has been 
substantiated with the Growth and Transformation Plan I and II. With the 
conviction that the increasing economic performance attained by the 
aforementioned programs could not be sustained without focusing on the 
manufacturing sector, the government introduced the Growth and Transformation 
Plan I in 2010/11. In the endeavor to realize this objective, the Plan authorizes the 
state to take the key leadership role (Planel and Bridonneau, 2015). Currently, Plan 
I has phased out and replaced by Plan II. The progresses achieved following such a 
move are discernible, especially when one looks at the expansion of industries 
from time to time. The country is working on a new line of industrial development. 
One can mention the very recent examples: the Hawassa Industrial Park (centered 
on textile and garment products) and Bole Lemi I Industrial Park (industrial hub 
for export- oriented manufacturers) which have recently become operational, while 
having many other ongoing projects.
1
 These industries are promising in terms of 
enhancing the country‘s economy. This is not, however, to discard some others‘ 
fear that the benefits of these mega projects would come and trickle-down to the 
poor at some distant future and thereby calling for a small-scale citizen-friendly 
engagements (Ayele, 2018). The concern is legitimate because the benefits of these 
grand projects may not necessarily be enjoyed anytime soon. 
The aforesaid successive development initiatives, forming part of the 
broader developmental state model, produced a persistently increasing economic 
development in the country (Clapham, 2017; Fesseha and Abtewold, 2017). The 
record of the growth rate varies across different sources. For instance, as noted in 
Clapham (2017), by the year 2015, the country‘s GDP growth rate was 9.6%, 
making it  the highest in Africa and second highest in the world. Based on the 
World Bank‘s report, Ethiopia scored annual growth rates of 10.4% in 2015, 7.6% 
                                                          
1
 Please visit this link http://www.investethiopia.gov.et/investment-opportunities/strategic-
sectors/industry-zone-development to see more on the projected additional industrial parks 





in 2016, and 10.2% in 2017 (WB, 2018a). It also affirms that the country achieved 
a remarkable economic growth averaging 10.3% a year from 2006/07 to 2016/17, 
compared to a regional average of 5.4% (WB, 2018b). For the UNDP also the 
GDP growth has shot up from 8.0% in 2015/16 (due to drought) to 10.9% in 
2016/17 (UNDP, 2018). Industry, especially the construction sub-sector, was the 
major contributor to growth in 2016/17 by taking over the services sector (ibid), 
probably indicating the emphasis given to the manufacturing sector in the GTP 
I&II. Despite the minor numeric variations, the progress manifested in the country 
has been acknowledged and testified by all authorities without reservation. This 
incredible achievement ranked Ethiopia among the world‘s fastest-growing 
economies in 2018 (WB, 2018c). Along the same line, the share of the population 
living below the national poverty line diminished from 30% in 2011 to 24% in 
2016 (WB, 2018b); while based on the international poverty line, poverty dropped 
from 27% in 2016 to 24% in 2018 (WB, 2018c). It is therefore undeniable that the 
developmental state orientation has brought impressive changes in respect of 
economic growth and industrialization.  
To stimulate and sustain the industrialization process in particular and 
economic transformation in general, the government has provided due attention to 
infrastructural development by allocating a significant share of its national budget. 
This is observable from the government‘s dedication to expand roads, railways, air 
transport, electrification, telecommunication, among others. In this respect, 
significant progress has been achieved, which is instrumental in the effort to make 
the country appealing for investment.  
The above noted promising economic growth coexists, however, with 
considerable downsides. There is a huge discrepancy between the rich and the 
poor. It is still possible to see people leading luxurious life and others suffering 
from a poverty quagmire. The economic growth could not significantly ameliorate 
this difference. Again, the health of the above indicated economic growth is 
questionable as there is a strong critique over its uneven distribution among 
various groups in the society (Melisew and Cochrane, 2018). For instance, 
according to Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) (2017), 
the percentage of the population living in severe poverty in Somali Region (81.9%) 
is much higher than Harari (36.6%) and Dire Dawa (38.5%). Similarly, the level of 
poverty reduction is not equal across urban and rural areas; the percentage of the 
rural population living in severe poverty is much higher (82.1%) than the urban 
population (21.0%), almost a quadruple. World Bank (2018c) also supports this 
assessment, arguing that poverty reduction is stronger in the urban areas while 
slower in the rural areas. This is attributable to the government‘s favor to major 
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cities over rural areas (IRIS, 2017). Moreover, corruption and illicit financial flows 
are what the government has strongly been blamed for. 
 
Some Detrimental Effects 
Notwithstanding the above marked economic progress, the developmental state 
model has not been flawlessly applied. Though the government says it is pursuing 
a democratic developmental state model, so far, it has worked mainly on the 
economic aspect of it and political transformation has been sidelined. It is rather 
true that the constantly achieved observable level of economic growth has served 
as a metric of governance, justifying all political malpractices and legitimizing the 
ever-increasing authoritarian tendency of the government (De Waal, 2018; 
Gebremariam, 2018; Fantini, 2013). It must be noted that it is not just the 
developmental state model per se that created the problem, but also the 
appropriation of the system‘s natural tendency to authoritarianism by leaders as a 
good opportunity to sustain their power and deepen their control. There are 
democratic developmental states; what counts is the presence of a committed and 
civic-minded leadership, which actually is missing in Ethiopia. Hence, democratic 
form of governance has remained a mere aspiration of the citizens. Simply put, 
Ethiopia is a democratic developmental state in name and an authoritarian 
developmental state in reality. In what follows, I will discuss the major aftermaths.  
Eroding the Value of Pluralism  
For a better realization of developmental state theory, a state needs to insulate itself 
from the demands of diverse social classes (Minns, 2001; Kim, 2009; Fritz and 
Menocal, 2007; Sehen and Tsegaye, 2012; Minns, 2006; Boyd and Ngo, 2005; 
Mkandawire, 2001). This assertion is based on the conviction that diverse local 
demands can detract the capacity of a state from achieving a better overall 
economic performance (Fritz and Menocal, 2007; Minns, 2006; United Nations, 
2007). Concurring with this, Onis (1991, p. 119) contends that a developmental 
state model is ―inconsistent with the vision of a pluralistic form of democracy, in 
which a multitude of small-scale interest groups enjoy broadly equal and 
unrestricted access to the state.‖ This is why some maintain that a developmental 
state neglects special interest claimants who may divert it from its main 
developmental priority (Onis, 1991, p. 119). Though it is not entirely impossible 
for a developmental state to consider diverse local interests, it is quite challenging 
and needs a determined, robust leadership.   
Ethiopia is the home of diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural groups. The 





a potential bottleneck in implementing the developmental state model as it 
hampers the consensus required for the model. However, it is also equally difficult 
to disregard the interests of these diverse groups. It seems to reconcile this 
contradiction that the state intentionally added a prefix democratic to the 
developmental state model (Muller, 2015). However, there are still disatisfactions 
by various groups regarding the division and sharing of power, resources, and 
social opportunities (Sehen and Tsegaye (2012). The resentments intensified as the 
government operates based on the policies and agendas set by the ruling-party at 
the center, without securing the consent and incorporating the interest of the 
diverse local community. Local knowledge, peculiarities, inputs and concerns have 
not been given due attention, while the very diversity of the people, ipso facto, 
necessitates the involvement of the people in the country‘s affairs. The single 
vanguard political party acts for the people in an I know for you logic. This is 
against the cardinal principle of a pluralistic democracy, which is popular 
participation. That is why, based on the Freedom House‘s assessment, Ethiopia has 
ranked worst for scoring 0 out of 16 in ‗political pluralism and participation‘, 
owing to the exclusion of the public from any genuine and autonomous political 
participation (Freedom House, 2018). The resultant political demonstrations 
erupted in various parts of the country were all quashed by the law enforcement 
agents of the government. It is therefore evident that the government has given a 
deaf ear to the peoples‘ voices, ideas, and opinions considering them as a negative 
energy dragging the government back from its way to ensure economic 
development. 
This happened, partly, due to the mingling of developmental state with the 
governments‘ philosophy of democratic centralism (that was borrowed from Lenin 
who used it to organize a tightly disciplined and centrally organized vanguard 
party) (Heywood, 2010) and revolutionary democracy that naturally allows for the 
political stage to be occupied by a few politicians relegating the public at large 
(Lefort, 2012). On this account, as Fantini (2013, p. 1) writes ―development 
policies, targets and programs are designed at the centre, authorizing regional and 
local authorities little room for maneuver, in a centralistic and top-down logic.‖ 
Despite the formal decentralized federal structure, there has been ―little recognition 
for local knowledge or the autonomous aspirations of groups and individuals‖ 
(Fantini, 2013, p.  6) thereby compromising the value of pluralism in the country. 
Differently put, a small circle of individuals in the ruling-party at the center sets 
and decides everything in a one size fits all attitude for the heterogeneous 
Ethiopian society. It would therefore be naïve to expect the flourishing of 
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pluralism with a dominant ruling-party committed to democratic centralism 
(Gebremariam, 2018). 
The author‘s conviction is, if the government, under the new leadership, 
continues to insulate itself from popular voices, local claims, and feelings of 
alienation just to achieve national developmental goals, the existing grievances 
manifested here and there can be intensified and further lead to severe conflicts 
and inter-group resentments in the country. This, in turn, would erode the chance 
for peace and development and renders the value of pluralism preached by the 
government meaningless. Therefore, the natural inclination of the involvement of 
the developmental state deep into economic performance, together with the weak 
commitment of the government of Ethiopia to entertain local claims, can worsen 
the existing grievances of the deeply divided society, whatever camouflaging 
(democratic) term the government may use. The destructive conflicts would, in 
turn, negatively affect the country‘s economic growth. Hence, exerting the best 
possible effort to have consensus-oriented governance is mandatory, given the 
deeply divided society the country has. 
Endangering Human Rights 
It is true that a developmental state theory requires a strong interventionist state. 
However, this does not mean that a developmental state theory is compatible only 
with authoritarian states as one can adduce the cases of Brazil, India, South Africa, 
Mauritius and Botswana, which run democratization and developmental 
programmes simultaneously (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). However, by virtue of its 
primary focus on economic development, one can note the likelihood of repression 
of certain rights and freedoms. In this respect, Bolesta (2007, p. 107) contends that 
―it seems justifiable to claim that a developmental state would be difficult to 
sustain in a fully democratic system in which people enjoy extensive rights.‖ It 
follows that a developmental state can be practiced at the cost of compromising the 
full enjoyment of human rights. 
Ethiopia has had an abysmal human rights violation records across 
successive regimes, in spite of the country‘s subscription to various national, 
regional and international human rights instruments (for details, see Endalcachew, 
2014). The current regime -EPRDF- is characterized by massive violations of 
human rights, especially civil and political rights. The regime‘s adherence to a 
developmental state model has served as a cover for further violations of the rights 
of citizens, as the model is preoccupied with economic growth. In giving priority 
for economic development, Meles Zenawi, the late prime minister of Ethiopia and 





that ―development and a strong state were  prerequisites for human rights, and 
Ethiopia needed to establish these  first‖ (De Waal, 2012, p. 155). He boldly and 
loudly stated that ―We must have growth, growth, growth……we can‘t have 
democracy with an empty belly‘‘ (De Waal, 2018, p. 5). One can infer from this 
argument that it is possible to put aside democracy in general and human rights in 
particular until a certain degree of economic development and state strength is 
achieved. In the course of questioning the genuine applicability of the model in the 
country, there is even a strong argument that the very reason of the country to turn 
its face to Eastern governments is because of their indifference for human rights 
and democracy (Muller, 2015). 
The bottom-line is economic development has been used, and will 
potentially continue to serve, as a legitimizing force for the violation of the rights 
of citizens. This issue would be much worrisome if one thinks of the waning of the 
pressure of the international community over domestic human rights records of 
states overtime (Melisew and Cochrane, 2018). The researcher maintains that 
economic growth and human rights should be pursued simultaneously, not in 
tandem as articulated by Meles; the freedoms of citizens must not be suppressed 
under the cover of economic growth. After all, the growth achieved through 
domineering citizens would not be sustainable as it inevitably raises grievances 
and instabilities. The recent political unrest permeated the country and the resultant 
destructions and losses caused are best evidences corroborating this argument. 
Hence, human rights are not luxury goods to be preceded by economic growth; 
they are rather equally intrinsically necessary. 
 
Entrenching a Single-Party Authoritarian Rule 
Athough the developmental state model is adopted both in democratic and 
undemocratic states, considerable researchers contend its difficulty in a democratic 
political environment (Haggard, 2018; Bolesta, 2007; Fritz and Menocal, 2007; 
Sehen and Tsegaye, 2012). This claim is drawn from the very nature of democracy 
to decentralize power and to make the state less autonomous and less insulated 
from societal demands (Fritz and Menocal, 2007), which is inconsistent with the 
requisites of a developmental state. Developmental states provide priority to 
economic development over political reform undermining the democratization 
process. Governments oriented towards the developmentalist ideology establish a 
strong and stable government that suppresses anything which goes against their 
developmental goals, as legitimacy is drawn from developmental achievements not 
from the consent of the people (Bolesta, 2007; United Nations, 2007). It is this fact 
which compelled scholars on the subject to affirm that there is a high tendency of a 
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developmental state becoming authoritarian, and to fear the replication of the East 
Asian model in other regions (Sehen and Tsegaye, 2012). 
There is a fragile democracy in Ethiopia underscoring the claim that 
developmental state has a tendency of becoming authoritarian. Its political 
governance has been characterized by a highly centralized single-party rule 
(EPRDF) (Clapham, 2006). There are authorities who argue that the raison d’être 
of the developmental state in Ethiopia is to ensure the continued authoritarian 
single-party dominance (Ayenachew, 2014). This argument makes sense if one 
closely examines the conviction of Meles about the importance, inter alia, of 
maintaining policy continuity for a sufficiently long time for a developmental state 
to succeed (De Waal, 2012). This idea goes against the very nature of electoral 
democracy which is prone to frequent government changes and perhaps policy 
discontinuity (Tsehai, 2009). On top of this, Meles went so far as to say ‗‗there is 
no reason to believe that democratization is a precondition of economic 
development‘‘ (Melisew and Cochrane, 2018: 8) by adducing economic 
developments under dictatorships in USSR and Germany (Fesseha and Abtewold, 
2017). It is economy and economy that matters!  
The practice on the ground has been in line with these ideas that the ruling-
party has had an iron grip on political power. The political space and all state 
apparatuses have for long been controlled by EPRDF and the country has 
undergone a democratic deficit. The government further expanded its control and 
deepened its dictatorship, especially following the 2005 historic election by 
eliminating anything challenging it, i.e. the opposition parties, civil society 
organizations and the media, among others. The late prime minister had a 
pessimistic attitude towards all these agents of democratization arguing that they 
would ‗easily become patronage mechanisms‘ in the Ethiopian context (Melisew 
and Cochrane, 2018) and as a result acted towards their complete elimination and 
thus ensured the ruling-party‘s political hegemony. The successive elections, as 
well as, multi-party system in the country are all façades, manipulated to 
consolidate the ruling-party‘s authoritarianism.  
It is this context which forced some authorities to comment that Ethiopia is 
following an ‗authoritarian developmental state‘ model (Thakur, 2009). Matfess 
(2015) labeled the Ethiopian system of governance as ―developmental 
authoritarianism‖ controlling virtually every aspect of the society. In a nutshell, the 
people have suffered from a heavy-handed single-party authoritarian rule under the 
cover of ensuring the country‘s stability and policy continuity for an effective 






Leading to Rampant Corruption  
The developmental state model is susceptible to corruption, though it is a 
possibility in other ideological models too. Unless the model is genuinely 
implemented, the state‘s intervention in and control of the economy can pave the 
way to misuse of state power and embezzle public assets. It is stressed that ―in the 
process of enriching the nation, the state might prefer to enrich itself and not the 
people‖ (Bolesta, 2007, p. 111). The close relation between economic bureaucrats 
and business sectors also leads to collusion or monopoly as it is witnessed in a 
series of corruption scandals in Japan and South Korea (Kim, 2009). 
It is plausible to make a remark that adopting and enforcing a 
developmental state model in an already corrupted bureaucratic system would be 
dangerous. It is common knowledge that African countries are notorious for their 
corrupt practices. This is affirmed by the United Nations (2007, p. 74) ―African 
states are too corrupt and predatory, and ruled by rent-seeking or just plain 
kleptocratic officials who prioritize their private interests over those of the state, 
and use rents to fund patronage for their constituents‖. Ethiopia is no exception; 
corruption prevails in different sectors. It is the researcher‘s belief that the 
country‘s adherence to the developmental state model has intensified the prevailing 
problem by giving officials a better chance to exploit the core economic sectors. 
The practice on the ground also proves this conviction. One can mention the 
recently spotlighted gross scandals in Sugar Corporation, Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam, Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise, 
Ethiopian Civil Aviation, and  Yayu Fertilizer Factory (Fana TV, November 2018), 
among others, to understand how much core economic sectors have been 
embezzled by top government officials. The greedy officials have, using their 
interventionist role and better relation with business sectors, exploited the 
country‘s resources massively and deposited the money abroad (Wubalem, 2016) 
while the poor are suffering from a grinding poverty and the government is looking 
for aid and loans from abroad. 
Corruption has therefore been deeply rooted in the Ethiopian political 
system and developed as an independent, strong system with a tough interest chain 
among officials at various levels of the government structure. On account of its 
strength and influence, corruption was labeled by the current Prime Minister, Abiy 
Ahmed, as ‗the fifth government‘ during his speech on the national anti-corruption 
day. 
Corruption creates not just unjustifiable income inequalities among 
citizens, but also causes conflicts and instabilities that, in turn, produce a breeding 
ground for intensified corruption.  
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Intensifying arbitrary intervention  
State intervention in the economy is a core feature of a developmental state model. 
However, the intervention should be made selectively in a way that facilitates the 
overall economic performance of a country. While this should have been the case, 
the reality in Ethiopia has shown an unlimited intervention of the state ―to the 
extent of being market unfriendly‖ (Ayenachew, 2014). This arbitrary and 
unrestricted interference in the economy has brought several detrimental effects 
like inflation and shortage of access to some basic commodities. This is against the 
very principle of developmental state model where the government intervenes in a 
capitalist economic environment (Bolesta, 2007).  
The most terrible effect of state intervention comes into the picture when 
one considers the issue of land ownership in Ethiopia. Ethiopians have a strong 
sentiment to land, which has for long been the crucial source of livelihood. The 
1995 FDRE constitution explicitly confers the ownership of urban and rural land to 
the state and its people (Art.40). And yet, it authorizes the state to displace citizens 
from their settled life when it is for the purpose of ―development‖ or ―public 
interest‖ by providing a commensurate compensation (Art.44). By using this 
permissive legal framework, the interventionist state has carried out several 
development programs, sometimes by adversely affecting citizens and leading 
them to serious grievances. The government has displaced several families, 
sometimes by inappropriately and extensively interpreting public interest. In this 
respect, one can adduce the displacement in Gambella and other Southern parts of 
the country and the Integrated Master Plan (IMP) for enlarging the capital city into 
the Oromo region (Matfess, 2015). The displacement is much more intense in 
Addis Ababa; countless people have been displaced from the center to the suburb 
in the name of public interest. And, the problem is that both sides loose: neither the 
displaced families get enough compensation to resume their life at where they are 
dumped nor the government projects are fully materialized to serve public 
interests. 
 
Recent Changes: too Little too Early 
Very recently, following Abiy Ahmed‘s premiership, some positive changes have 
been observed. Within a short time, the government has created optimism on the 
part of the people. To mention some positive changes witnessed, the government is 
striving to liberalize the political space for various competing forces. Exiled 
opposition political parties were all invited to come back, and almost all are now 
operating domestically side-by-side with the ruling party, which was the only game 





freedom that the media are enjoying. They are addressing several political issues 
including serving as a platform to challenge the government, which was not 
possible in the pre Abiy leaderships. Moreover, the government is revising the 
Charities and Societies proclamation that has for long keptout civil society 
organizations from political activities, especially in the post-2005 election. 
The prime minister has also started to build the legitimacy of the 
government through reforming various institutional frameworks, including the 
security institutions. The government has made a good start in listening the voices 
and concerns of the people. The new prime minister began his office by conducting 
a public discussion in several parts of the country, which allowed the people to 
express their pressing issues.  
In addition, the government is trying to serve justice by bringing 
transgressors to the courts of law. In view of this, some top government officials 
are brought before a court for their grave corruption scandals. This tells us that the 
new administration has started the anti-corruption struggle. Those engaged in 
massive human rights violation as well have started facing justice.  
Despite the positive changes seen, the government is entangled with 
various challenges. One basic challenge is that the government lacks internal 
coherence as the parties constituting the coalition government have no common 
understanding of the ongoing reforms being made and future programs and visions 
of the government (Semir, 2018). Being dissatisfied by the reform, the TPLF is 
operating virtually independently in its constituency. As a way of undermining the 
actions being taken by the new leadership, it has shielded its former flagitious top 
officials who were involved in corruption and human rights violations from facing 
justice. This entails that the government is not exercising an effective control over 
the entire territories of the state. On top of that, the weakening of the coalition has 
undermined the state‘s monopoly on the use of force to ensure peace (Michael, 
2018). To complicate the matter, some opposition factions that recently entered the 
country are also colliding with the government and igniting the upsurge of violence 
in different parts of the country. As a consequence, lawlessness, insecurity, and 
distrust have become very critical concerns unfathomably complicating the 
country‘s long-standing problems.    
There are ambivalent feelings as to the country‘s possible transition to 
democracy. The situation is truly represented as, to use Solomon‘s words, 
―Ethiopia‘s spring of hope and winter of despair‖ (Solomon, 2018). Despite the 
reforms started, it is difficult to believe beyond any doubt that the changes brought 
so far by the new administration are likely to continue and bring the long-awaited 
genuine political change in the country. In this connection, there are even concerns 
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that the new prime minister has been hanging on pressing issues for propaganda 
and media consumption without establishing new solid institutional setups on the 
ground. Besides, even some new changes have created new concerns on the part of 
some ethnic groups. 
Moreover, there is a reasonable fear that the country‘s age-old 
authoritarian culture of governance may still have a lingering effect. Hence, the 
country is cross-roads; it is thus difficult to arrive at a conclusion based on the 
aforementioned progresses made by the government. The new changes witnessed 
are too little too early to be optimistic. On top of that it is unclear whether Abiy‘s 
rule will continue to implement the developmental state model or make a departure 
from it. For that matter, the prime minister did not say anything about the 
developmental state orientation of the country, being more concerned with the 
spiraling political turmoil in the country.  
 
Conclusion  
The developmental state model was introduced in Ethiopia by the incumbent 
government after a decade of rule based on the western liberal model. Following 
the rise of alternative politico-economic model in the East, the government 
resorted to the developmental state, believing that the western free market 
economic system cannot function in Ethiopia‘s condition without a selective state 
intervention. The developmental state model has brought an exponential economic 
growth testified by various researchers and international multilateral financial 
institutions. However, the government has used the increasing economic growth as 
a metric of governance and thus prioritized economic development and put off 
democracy to be achieved down the line. The natural inclination of the model to 
despotism, coupled with the inherent interest of the ruling-party to sustain its 
power and deepen its control, caused an improper application of the model and put 
the country with an ever-increasing authoritarianism. Very recently, some 
important changes are being made in the political realm following the appointment 
of a new prime minister, but the changes are too little too early to rely on to 
conclude that the government is properly applying the model and the country is 
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